Welcome to my website!
I am a financial economist studying non-bank financial intermediation. My recent work focuses on delegated asset management, financial advice and angel investing.
 “The Globalization of Angel Investments: Evidence Across Countries”
with Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar and Karen Wilson
Journal of Financial Economics (2018)
Across 21 countries, angel funding generates a positive impact on firm growth, performance, survival, and follow-on fundraising.
MEDIA: Angel Capital Association
 “Does FinTech Democratize Investing?” (July, 2020)
with Michael Reher
We examine the distributional effects of access to a novel financial technology: automated asset management. A 90% reduction in minimum account size requirements by a major U.S. robo-advisor increases participation in both asset management and the stock market by households from the middle quintiles of the U.S. wealth distribution. These households experience a 24 percentage point increase in risky share and a 1.9 percentage point increase in expected return relative to wealthier households. However, the reduction does not affect households from the poorest wealth quintile, suggesting that automated asset management has ambiguous effects on overall inequality in returns on wealth.
PRESENTATIONS: California Corporate Finance Conference 2019, CAFR FinTechWorkshop 2020, NY Fed Fintech Conference 2020, The Paris Conference on FinTech and Cryptofinance 2020, Toronto Fintech Conference 2020, Georgetown Fintech Seminar Series 2020
Do limitations on commissions paid to financial advisers reduce prices of financial products and stimulate investment? I examine this question by estimating the causal effects of regulating commissions for mutual fund distribution. I exploit the unique institutional setting in Israel and the 2013 policy change when the government reduced commissions differently for different fund types. The reform led to a major decline in fund expense ratios and a consequent increase in fund flows. Funds with price-sensitive investors experienced a 35% larger inflows. I interpret these results as investor response to price competition fostered by a reduction in distribution costs.
PRESENTATIONS: SGF Conference 2020, AFA Annual Meeting 2021 (scheduled)
 “Paying for Beta: Leverage Demand and Asset Management Fees” (June, 2020)
with Steffen Hitzemann and Mingzhu Tai
We examine how investor demand for leverage shapes asset management fees. In our model, investors’ leverage demand generates a cross-section of positive fees even if all managers produce zero risk-adjusted returns. We nd support for the model’s novel predictions in the sample of the U.S. equity mutual funds: (1) fees increase in fund market beta precisely for beta larger than one; (2) this relation becomes stronger when leverage constraints tighten; and (3) low net alphas are especially common among high-beta funds. These results suggest that asset managers can earn fees above their risk-adjusted returns for providing their investors with leverage.
PRESENTATIONS: FIRS 2020
Previously titled as “Does Passive Investing Help Relax Short-Sale Constraints?”
We examine the effects of passive investing on security lending outcomes and price efficiency for the 2007-2017 period. These effects cannot be fully explained by the standard lending supply channel. While all institutional investors contribute to lending supply, only passive ownership improves price efficiency. Additionally, increased passive ownership correlates with higher lending fees and higher short interest. We propose a complementary, demand-based strategic borrowing channel wherein short-sellers prefer to borrow from passive investors to reduce dynamic short-selling risks. Consistent with our hypotheses, increased passive ownership is associated with lower fee, recall, and information leakage risks, and longer loan duration.
PRESENTATIONS: NYU Stern, UNC Kenan-Flagler, USC Marshall, IDC Summer Finance Conference 2019, Triple Crown Conference 2019, The CUHK International Finance Conference 2019, University of Oklahoma
The portfolio manager compensation is influenced by fund flows driven by past raw returns. Managers are thus paid equally for fund superior performance and for the fund’s passive benchmark returns.
PRESENTATIONS: AFA Annual Meeting 2018, Darden School of Business, Boston Fed, AQR Capital Management, Hebrew University